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EDITORIAL 
 
There is No Scope for Tobacco Funded 
Research in our Society 
 
The following position statement has been endorsed by the Executive Committee 
of the International Society for the Prevention of Tobacco Induced Diseases.
 
The  International Society for the Prevention of 
Tobacco Induced Diseases is a Multidisciplinary group 
of tobacco control advocates comprising laboratory 
scientists, clinicians, health care researchers and public 
health workers. Their common aim is the prevention of 
recruitment of any individual to nicotine addiction and 
tobacco dependency, the promotion of smoking cessa-
tion and elucidation of the mechanisms and outcomes 
of injury caused by smoking. 
A major objective of global tobacco control is to 
restrict the ability of transnational tobacco companies to 
promote their products, glamorize smoking in the eyes 
of young people, propagate misleading information 
about the harm of active and passive smoking and delay 
or dilute legislation. 
In the third Annual Scientific Meeting of the So-
ciety in Louisville Kentucky, U.S., in October 2004, 
two of the posters gave acknowledgement to funding 
by the Philip Morris External Research Programme 
(PMERP). Although these are the only two such cases 
in the Society’s three-year history, the Executive Com-
mittee regrets that this happened and wishes to reaffirm 
that there is no scope whatsoever for any tobacco spon-
sored or influenced activities within the Society. Al-
though the Society’s rules and intentions may not have 
been sufficiently clear, the Executive Committee has 
now resolved to never again accept tobacco funded 
research for presentation or publication.  
While authors of tobacco funded research may 
deny any influence of their paymasters on their outputs, 
this is not the point. The tobacco industry is currently 
seeking to reposition itself, acquire new legitimacy, 
ingratiate itself with lawmakers and desperately avoid 
the impacts of both legislation and litigation which will 
damage their sales and budgets. The industry’s defence 
lawyers state in the current trial in Washington, D.C., 
(under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganization Act-RICO), that the tobacco industry should 
be judged on its present behaviour, not its past history. 
The question is how much mendacity and anti-social 
behaviour can be swept under even large carpets? 
As reported in the November issue of Academic 
Medicine [1], journal of the American Medical Col-
leges, the industry has recently “exploited institutional 
fears of losing research funding as part of its strategy 
to avoid tobacco stock divestment by US medical 
schools.” As stated by Ruth Malone RN, PhD, senior 
author of the report and associate professor of nursing 
in University of California, San Francisco, School of 
Nursing, “Funding research is a way the industry tries 
to buy legitimacy. There are contradictions in selling 
off tobacco stocks while continuing to take money de-
rived from tobacco profits.” [1] 
There are contradictions too for ISPTID. If we al-
low the presentation of tobacco funded research at our 
meetings we would have to pretend that the entire his-
tory of the corruption of science by big tobacco did not 
matter any longer. 
In 1988 Philip Morris, Lorillard and RJ Reynolds 
formed the “Centre for Indoor Air Research” (CIAR) to 
support research on “indoor air quality.” The aim was 
to distance the new organization of CIAR from the US 
Tobacco Institute and encourage scientists outside the 
industry to participate. The CIAR was wholly funded 
and controlled by the industry. Professor Richard Day-
nard of Northeastern University School of Law, Boston, 
Massachusetts, U.S., is quoted as saying, “Their true 
purpose was to generate disformation.” [2] 
As part of the 1998 US Attorneys General Master 
Settlement (Minnesota) with the industry, it was agreed 
that the US Tobacco Institute and the CIAR would be 
disbanded. Following this Philip Morris established the 
PMERP, in place of CIAR, in the same offices of the 
same town in Maryland, under the same director, Dr. 
Max Eisenberg. [3] 
The aims of PMERP are apparently in large 
measure to counter public health advocacy for tighter 
tobacco control by being seen to be doing good. History 
suggests that ISPTID should not allow itself to be en-
snared in this process. 
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In the late 1970s and 1980s the concealment and 
obfuscation of the harmful effects of both mainstream 
and sidestream (second-hand) smoke became a major 
project within the transnational tobacco companies. As 
described recently in The Lancet of November 11, 
2004, Pascal Diethelm, Jean-Charles Rielle and Martin 
Mckee [4] used previously secret industry documents to 
dissect the covert operations of Philip Morris (PM). 
They describe how PM sought to inform themselves of 
the hazards of their products but deny or misrepresent 
their laboratory findings to others. PM even carefully 
hid the research operations from most of their staff. One 
former employee is quoted as stating in 1996 “I subse-
quently found out (by asking around) that hardly any-
one [at Philip Morris] knew anything about INBIFO”. 
INBIFO was the Institute für Industrielle und Biol-
gische Forschung GMbH which Philip Morris bought 
as part of its offshore research operation. A PM execu-
tive said its purchase would create “a locale where we 
might do some of the things which we are reluctant to 
do in this country” (i.e., the U.S.). Another senior PM 
executive said that research “on a contractual basis 
in Europe…presents an opportunity that is relatively 
lacking in risk and unattractive repercussions in this 
country.” 
Some of the unpublished research findings in 
INBIFO reports are staggering in terms of their clarity 
and implications. For example, as described by Di-
ethelm and colleagues [4], the rat experiments involv-
ing exposures to either mainstream or sidestream smoke 
clearly delineate the biological toxicity of the different 
chemical profiles of these agents: 
 
“All rats showed general signs of exhaus-
tion after the end of the daily exposure. In 
contrast to the rats of the mainstream group, 
which recovered by next morning, the rats 
of the sidestream groups continued to show 
shaggy fur and some pronounced respira-
tory symptoms characterized by whistling 
and rattling sounds.” 
 
The report also concluded that: 
 
• The mainstream total particulate matter 
(TPM) would have to be increased three 
fold to produce similar reactions to those 
seen with sidestream exposure. 
• Sidestream smoke (“puffed or non-
puffed”) caused more severe atrophic and 
necrotic lesions of the olfactory epithelium 
and frequent squamous cell metaplasia in 
the ciliated epithelium of the nasal cavity. 
• In terms of equal TPM concentration, 
sidestream smoke showed higher toxicity in 
terms of body weight development, food 
consumption, rectal temperature and respi-
ratory frequency, than mainstream smoke. 
 
Diethelm and colleagues state that these findings 
were discussed in a letter to Dr. Thomas Osdene, chief 
scientist at Philip Morris, by Professor Ragnar Ry-
lander, formerly chair of Environmental Medicine at 
Gothenberg University, who also held an adjunct pro-
fessorial position at Geneva University. Rylander was a 
longstanding consultant to Philip Morris receiving, 
from the 1980s, $150,000 a year in fees and other com-
pensation. [2] Rylander stated to Osdene, “The histol-
ogy demonstrates more advanced lesions in the nasal 
epithelium and hyper- and metaplasia in areas which 
are not affected by mainstream smoke. The extent of 
cornification observed in these animals has never been 
seen before.” If the industry had published these find-
ings 22 years ago, public health measures to protect 
children, workers and the general public from second-
hand smoke might be well advanced and institutional-
ized world-wide. Instead the industry has spent hun-
dreds of millions of dollars to block and disable even 
the most basic protective measures against passive 
smoking. The consequences can be counted in illness 
episodes, hospital admissions, premature deaths and a 
massive cost to communities. 
As stated in the conflict of interest statement in 
the Lancet article, Professor Rylander took legal action 
against two of the authors of the Lancet paper after they 
publicly exposed his covert activities for the tobacco 
industry. After three court cases including two appeals, 
judgment was given in favour of the defendants, Di-
ethelm and Rielle. The court considered that Rylander 
had perpetrated “unprecedented scientific fraud.” In a 
recent review by a special ethics committee in Geneva 
University, chaired by Professor Alex Mauron, its con-
clusion was: 
 
“Considering his close association with the 
tobacco industry and the duplicity of his at-
titude throughout his professional career, it 
appears that Ragnar Rylander was not able 
to preserve his intellectual independence in 
the face of specific commercial interests. 
Documentary evidence leads one to believe 
that the attitude he adopted in his profes-
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sional life consisted in unilaterally defend-
ing the interests of the tobacco industry in 
the conflict pitting the latter against scien-
tists convinced of the harmful effects of 
passive smoking. He helped to elaborate the 
industry’s strategy and in his agreements 
with the industry accepted a secrecy clause 
that led him to suppress information known 
to him regarding the toxic effects of smok-
ing. The Commission considers it legiti-
mate to doubt the validity of the body of 
Ragnar Rylander’s work directly or indi-
rectly concerned with tobacco smoke.” 
 
Professor Rylander of course rejects these find-
ings. The Geneva court judgement and Geneva Univer-
sity enquiry report are now on the ISPTID website so 
that members may form their own views. 
While we are not suggesting that any colleagues 
who have taken PMERP funds are intellectually dis-
honest, the history of tobacco funding of research 
shows such a large systematic bias in some of the out-
puts that we cannot, at this stage, have any confidence 
in tobacco funded activities. 
Questions remain as to the extent to which to-
bacco control advocates should in the future participate 
in engagements with any arm of the industry or those 
who are funded by them. A group of about 75 people 
from tobacco sectors, together with eight from the 
industry met recently in New Orleans to address the 
questions: 
1. What are the potential risks and benefits of to-
bacco industry sponsorship of scientific research? 
2. Are there procedures or mechanisms that could 
help protect against the types of research abuse that 
have occurred in the past and that some believe are con-
tinuing to occur? 
A report by Mitchell Zeller [5] on Globalink 
States: 
 
“A number of issues and ideas were dis-
cussed by the group. The need for far 
greater transparency by the tobacco indus-
try in the area of research funding was dis-
cussed. The Workshop also explored the 
theoretical possibility of creating an inde-
pendent institution to distribute funds for 
research, including funds received from the 
tobacco industry. This independent institu-
tion would, of course, need to be free of in-
fluence from the tobacco industry in its op-
eration in order to be credible and effective. 
However, no consensus was reached on the 
feasibility or desirability of this idea. 
 
The Planning Committee believes that the 
Workshop objectives were met. Different 
viewpoints on this controversial topic were 
aired in a civil and respectful manner. Par-
ticipants hopefully came away better in-
formed as a result of their attendance at the 
Workshop. We firmly believe it is worth-
while to promote open discussion of the 
ethical, legal and policy issues of tobacco 
industry funding of tobacco research. Opin-
ions across the entire spectrum are a wel-
come part of that dialogue and we are quite 
satisfied that our forum was a success in 
meeting that goal.” 
 
In the meantime and in the absence of an alterna-
tive formal approach, ISPTID will take all possible 
steps to distance itself from tobacco sponsorship in any 
form. It is a clearly stated rule of the Society that all 
conflicts of interest must be declared and tobacco 
funded projects will not be accepted for presentation or 
publication in any form. 
The future of the prevention of tobacco induced 
disease critically depends on the prevention of the 
industry usurping any new and bogus role in tobacco 
control. Whether any alternative and safe model based 
on tobacco funding can be developed remains to be 
seen. 
 
Anthony J. Hedley 
Department of Community Medicine 
University of Hong Kong 
Hong Kong, China 
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